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Abstract—This paper presents IFAL, a provably secure and
privacy conscious scheme for Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2X) communication. Issue First Activate
Later (IFAL) is a practical and secure improvement to the
leading European candidate for V2X (ETSI) and one that also
merits over the leading US standard. IFAL incorporates a
novel cryptographic mechanism that both avoids the need for
certiﬁcate revocation and which supports vehicles with limited
and intermittent connectivity. We introduce a new construction
that is equivalent to symmetric key diversiﬁcation in the public
key setting with short, time-delayed activation. We also present a
new formalisation of V2X security and privacy which we apply to
IFAL to show that it is a provably secure and privacy conscious
V2X scheme. IFAL is ETSI compliant and ready for integration
into the standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2X)
communication introduces a number of conﬂicting require-
ments which make the design of Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) particularly challenging [1]. Close-range vehi-
cle linkability is a key feature of V2X that enables enhanced
situational awareness and which makes V2X a viable safety
feature. ITS must harmonise the requirement for close-range
linkability, vehicle authentication and accountability with the
need to adequately protect the vehicle owner from the type
of long-term tracking that threatens to uniquely identify their
individual habits.
Long-term tracking data from ride-hailing services such as
Uber has been misused to facilitate corporate espionage [2],
track the whereabouts of important persons and to identify
customers engaging in one-night stands [3]. It is therefore
highly important that ITS are designed to prevent similar
attacks being performed against connected cars executing
standard protocols. The European Data Protection Working
Party have identiﬁed the legal requirement for protection in
relation to ITS vehicle data and have speciﬁcally called for
new measures which limit the risks of long-term vehicle
tracking [4].
The two main Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) proposals for
ITS are the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) standardised approach [5] and the U.S. Department
of Transportation (USDOT) approach based on the Secure
Credential Management System (SCMS) [6]. The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Wireless Access
in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard [7] provides the
common V2X message structure that is used by both of
the main ITS proposals. The adoption of these standards is
strongly encouraged by a European Parliament ITS Directive
[8] which mandates interoperable communication between
vehicles. Volkswagen, Toyota, General Motors and Daimler
have already announced that they are using ETSI and WAVE
standards for V2X communication [9].
Both the ETSI and USDOT PKI systems use a number
of Certiﬁcate Authorities (CA) and Certiﬁcate Revocation
Lists (CRL) to manage the credentials of vehicles. Privacy
is managed by issuing each vehicle a long-term authorisation
certiﬁcate and an additional number of short-term pseudony-
mous certiﬁcates which are used to sign V2X messages.
Drivers are held accountable by an authority who can compel
the certiﬁcate authorities to collude and link a pseudonym
certiﬁcate with the registered owner of a vehicle.
It is particularly important that ITS PKI supports the re-
vocation of credentials from misbehaving entities which send
incorrect information. Both ITS standards use the CRL method
for revoking credentials, effectively a blacklist of revoked
credentials that is checked during each signature validation.
The CRL method suffers from several drawbacks, including
that the size is likely to grow very large given the antici-
pated scale of vehicular networks. Large CRL are particularly
problematic when considering the latency between receiving a
signed message and verifying that the corresponding certiﬁcate
has not been revoked.
In recognition of the shortcomings of CRL in an ITS
environment, the USDOT ITS standard uses linkage-based
revocation [10] which reduces the size of the CRL to just one
key per vehicle. However, with around 300 million registered
cars in each of Europe and America, limited vehicle resources
and tight signature processing constraints, this is still far
from ideal. The ETSI standard is yet to ﬁnalise a revocation
mechanism.
A. Our Contribution
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Our new IFAL V2X scheme, which is fully compliant
with the ETSI standard and has additional features such
as the ability to pre-issue pseudonym certiﬁcates that are
only usable upon receiving small activation codes (via
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e.g. SMS). IFAL offers a much greater ﬂexibility with
regards to vehicle connectivity and furthermore avoids
the need for certiﬁcate revocation which does not scale
and is hard to implement in real-time systems.
• The ﬁrst formalisation of the security and privacy require-
ments set out in the ETSI ITS standard, in a provable
security setting.
• A new key diversiﬁcation mechanism with time-delayed
activation in the public-key setting which may have
applications beyond V2X.
B. Related Work
The ETSI ITS architecture [5] was developed from a number
of earlier projects [11], including SeVeCom which developed
many of the initial solutions for secure V2X communication
[12]. The Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) was
inﬂuential in motivating the development of the ETSI ITS
standards [13]. The ISO/TC204 [14] and IEEE 1609 WAVE [7]
standards are important complimentary contributions that have
been developed in parallel. The EVITA project developed a
secure onboard vehicular system architecture that incorporates
a hardware security module (HSM) for performing crypto-
graphic operations [15]. The PRESERVE project developed
a ‘close-to-market’ V2X implementation that integrates the
EVITA onboard vehicle architecture with a broad range of
other projects and standards including ETSI ITS [16].
In the US, SCMS [6] is the leading candidate architecture
for V2X. SCMS is currently in the proof-of-concept develop-
ment stage and is expected to be ﬁnalised in late 2020 [17].
SCMS shares a number of similarities with the ETSI ITS
standard, however it uses an implicit certiﬁcate [18] based
PKI which is incompatible with IFAL certiﬁcates. Implicit
certiﬁcates save storage and transmission space by omitting
the public key which they authenticate. In contrast to explicit
certiﬁcates, implicit certiﬁcates have received relatively little
cryptographic scrutiny [18] and are the subject of a number
of patents [19], [20], [21] which risk misuse by means of
becoming standard-essential [22].
Pseudonyms for vehicle privacy in V2X were ﬁrst proposed
by the SeVeCom project [12] and have been adopted by both
of the leading V2X architectures [5], [7], [6]. ETSI have
yet to standardise a certiﬁcate change strategy but recently
published a survey of candidate methods in [23]. SCMS im-
plements the C2C-CC pseudonym certiﬁcate pooling approach
[24] in which there are 20-40 simultaneously valid vehicle
credentials. It has been shown that even so-called ‘perfectly
unlinkable’ pseudonym change strategies that use a different
pseudonym for every message are vulnerable to attacks that
use Multi-Hypothesis-Tracking to link position and trajectory
from different messages [25]. Achieving k-anonymity has been
attempted using silent periods [26], [27] and mix-zones [28],
[29] but these techniques trade system safety and availability
for privacy by introducing the possibility of V2X messages
that are not transmitted or unable to be recovered, respectively.
Both leading V2X standards use role separation to provide
unlinkability between different vehicle pseudonym certiﬁcates.
In the event of vehicle misbehaviour, certiﬁcate authorities
are expected to collaborate in order to resolve the canonical
vehicle identity which can then have its certiﬁcates withdrawn.
The REWIRE revocation protocol [30] uses trusted computing
to provide enhanced vehicle privacy that avoids the need
for pseudonym resolution. Under the assumption of trusted
computing onboard each vehicle, REWIRE has the advantage
of providing privacy against malicious and collaborating cer-
tiﬁcate authorities. The OTOKEN protocol is an extension of
REWIRE that incorporates the results of formally analysing
the original protocol [31]. The PUCA architecture builds upon
the C2C-CC pseudonym scheme and the REWIRE revocation
protocol by using anonymous credentials between vehicles and
pseudonym certiﬁcate authorities to provide ‘full anonymity
for honest users’ [32]. In further developments, Direct Anony-
mous Attestation (based on group signatures) has been applied
to remove the pseudonym certiﬁcate authority altogether by
allowing vehicles to generate their own pseudonyms [33].
Both REWIRE and PUCA assume that the vehicle trusted
computing platform cannot be compromised, and that the
vehicle computer will reliably deliver revocation messages
to the trusted platform, as they decentralise trust from the
certiﬁcate authorities to the vehicles.
IFAL provides an improvement to the ETSI ITS security
architecture that avoids the need for certiﬁcate revocation by
introducing pre-issued pseudonym certiﬁcates that are only
usable upon receiving small activation codes (e.g. via SMS).
IFAL deﬁnes a certiﬁcate change strategy that is less suscepti-
ble to impersonation attacks [34] than the C2C-CC pseudonym
certiﬁcate pooling approach [24] adopted by the US standards
[6]. Lastly, IFAL retains the centralised control over vehicle
revocation which is lost by some of the more privacy-friendly
and less standards-compliant architectures [32], [33].
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces notation and the syntax and security
deﬁnitions for key derivation functions and digital signature
schemes. Most of it is standard, we refer the reader to
Krawczyk [35] and Goldreich [36], respectively, for a more
thorough explanation.
A. Notation
With respect to encryption we use subscripted lower case k’s
to refer to symmetric encryption keys and subscripted upper
case P ’s to refer to public keys. Correspondingly, we use
enc(ki,m) and ENC(Pi,m) to refer to the symmetric and
public key encryption of the arbitrary message m under keys
ki and Pi, respectively. We use Hash(m) to denote a secure
hash function applied to a message m. When choosing an
element k uniformly at random from a set K we write k $←− K.
To distinguish between group and scalar multiplication we use
‘×’ and ‘∗’ respectively.
Where s is a bitstring of length n, we deﬁne |s| = n. Where
q is either prime or an order of 2, and n is prime and greater
than 2160, we use C to denote an elliptic curve over a ﬁnite
ﬁeld Fq , and we use G to denote a point on the curve which
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generates a cyclic subgroup of order n under addition. We
require that the discrete logarithm problem in the subgroup
spanned by G is hard.
In the formal setting we use the term t to refer to some
infeasible computational duration and the term ε to mean some
negligible quantity such that t/ε is greater than the running
time of any feasible attacker.
B. Key Derivation Function
A key derivation function (KDF) is a function which is used
to produce cryptographically strong pseudorandom keys from
some cryptographically inadequate initial source of random-
ness. The standard deﬁnition [35] demands that the output
from a secure KDF is computationally indistinguishable from
a random bitstring of the same length.
Deﬁnition 1 (Key Derivation Function). A KDF is an algo-
rithm K which takes as input a value k sampled from a source
of keying material and a length parameter l. Optionally a salt
value r and a context variable x are also input. The KDF
output is a bitstring of l bits.
The security of a KDF depends on the properties of the
source of keying material, which we now deﬁne.
Deﬁnition 2 (KDF Source). A source of keying material Φ is
an efﬁcient algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
η and outputs a probability distribution tuple (k, α).
In the probability distribution output by source Φ, k is the
secret key which is input to the KDF and α represents auxiliary
knowledge about k which is known to the attacker.
(t,q,ε)-Secure-KDF-GameK(η, q,A) :
(k, α) ← Φ(η)
(x, l) ← AOK(k,·,·)(α)
b
$←− {0, 1}
if b = 0 then
b′ ← AOK(k,·,·)(α,K(k, l, x))
else
x′ $←− {0, 1}l
b′ ← AOK(k,·,·)(α, x′)
win if b = b′
Deﬁnition 3 ((t,q,ε)-Secure-KDF-Game). The security of a
KDF is formalised as a distinguishing game which is played
between a challenger and an adversary A. The challenger
ﬁrst provides a source of keying material (k, α) by calling
the source algorithm Φ. The adversary A is provided with
auxiliary knowledge α about the KDF input and is given
access to the KDF oracle OK. For queries i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
the KDF oracle responds to adaptively chosen context and
length queries (xi, li) made by the adversary. Eventually, after
q′ queries, the adversary must output a target context and
length tuple (x, l). Next, the challenger chooses a random bit
b. If b = 0 then A is provided with the output of K(k, l, x),
else A is given a random bitstring. Finally, the adversary is
once more given adaptive access to the KDF oracle OK and
may make up to q − q′ queries, after which the adversary is
required to output a bit b′. The adversary is disallowed from
submitting (x, l) to the KDF oracle. The adversary wins the
game if b′ = b.
Deﬁnition 4 (Secure KDF). A KDF K is said to be (t, q, ε)-
secure with respect to a source of keying material Φ if no
attacker running in time t and making at most q queries can
win the (t,q,ε)-Secure-KDF-Game with a probability greater
than 1/2 + ε.
C. Digital Signature Scheme
Formally, a digital signature scheme is a triple (G,S,V) of
efﬁcient algorithms, where
• G is a key-generation algorithm that takes as input the
security parameter η and outputs a pair of bitstrings (s, v)
which are the signing and veriﬁcation keys respectively;
• S is a signing algorithm which takes as input a signing
key s and a message m and outputs a signature σ on the
message m;
• V is a veriﬁcation algorithm that takes as input a veriﬁca-
tion key v, a signature σ, and a message m, and outputs
true if σ is a valid signature on m.
The standard security deﬁnition for public key signature
schemes is the notion of existential forgery on adaptively
chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) [38]. The deﬁnition
involves a game in which the adversary is given access to
a target public key and to an oracle which will sign arbitrary
messages. The adversary wins the game if it can provide a
signature with respect to the public key on a message that it
has not submitted to the signing oracle.
EUF-CMA∑(η,B) :
(s, v) ← G(η)
(m,σ) ← BOS(s,·)(v)
win if V(v, σ,m) = true
Deﬁnition 5 (EUF-CMA). A digital signature scheme
∑
=
(G,S,V) is said to be secure against EUF-CMA if for all
efﬁcient adversaries B, the probability of the experiment
EUF-CMA∑(B) = true is a negligible function of η.
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL
This section describes the ETSI V2X system model, the
broadcast message format and the threat model under which
we analyse the scheme.
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Fig. 1. ETSI Standard V2X PKI architecture [5].
A. V2X System Model
In this paper, we follow the ETSI ITS model for V2X [5]
shown in Figure 1. ITS systems (vehicles) are equipped with
an onboard unit (OBU). Each OBU contains a trusted hardware
element (TE), most likely a smart card, which provides secure
key storage and can perform some basic cryptographic opera-
tions. The PKI environment comprises one or more of both an
enrolment authority (EA) and an authorisation authority (AA).
The role of an EA is the long-term identiﬁcation and authen-
tication of ITS systems. An AA authorises pseudonymised
ITS systems to use a particular application or service. The
separation of EA and AA functionality is intended to facilitate
user privacy [39].
B. V2X Broadcast Message Format
In the ETSI model the messages which are exchanged
between vehicles to create and maintain situational awareness
are termed Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM) [37].
CAM are structured according to the ETSI CAM security
proﬁle [40] of the IEEE WAVE standard [41]. The general
structure of a CAM message is shown in Figure 2.
C. Threat Model
For our formalisation of V2X privacy we assume that the
vehicle OBU is an honest device which will correctly execute
the IFAL algorithms and which has access to a clock source
which is loosely synchronised with other vehicle OBUs. This
assumption is necessary because an untrustworthy OBU could
send arbitrary privacy-compromising data to nearby listeners
(e.g. a unique value could be inserted into every message). If
the clock source were adversarially controlled then a vehicle
could be tricked into signing its messages using a speciﬁc
or previously-seen pseudonym certiﬁcate, undermining the
privacy provided by periodic pseudonym change. This is the
same assumption that is made when modelling the privacy
properties of Direct Anonymous Attestation [42].
For our formalisation of both security and privacy we
assume that the vehicle TE is a trusted and suitably audited
secure hardware element which can generate an ECDSA
key-pair, securely store the private key and will correctly
execute the IFAL message signing algorithm. Any mass market
smart-card such as the NXP SmartMX or JCOP Java cards
would make a suitable TE. We assume that the EA and
AA are honest-but-curious [36] adversaries that will correctly
execute the IFAL protocol, which do not collude, but that may
opportunistically attempt to learn more than is speciﬁed by the
protocol. All of this is directly inherited from the ETSI ITS
standard.
Our formalisation of V2X security holds under the weaker
assumption that the OBU may be malicious, although denial-
of-service is a possibility in this setting. IFAL ensures that
V2X security is retained provided the TE is uncompromised.
We focus our analysis on the cryptographic properties of
IFAL as a secure and privacy conscious V2X scheme, and
therefore we assume that the metadata of the network and
the lower communication layers cannot be used to identify
vehicles. This is a realistic assumption when considering that
PKI enrolment and certiﬁcate ﬁle issuance in our scheme is
a one-time process, and is likely to take place at manufacture
ITS
Header
Basic
Container
HF Container
LF Container
(Conditional)
Special Vehicle Container (Conditional)
Fig. 2. General structure of a CAM [37].
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time. The delivery of IFAL activation codes can be highly
infrequent and may even take place ofﬂine, for example during
vehicle servicing.
IV. REQUIREMENTS
This section deﬁnes the standard requirements for ETSI
compatible V2X security architecture. We denote the security,
privacy and functional requirements by SR, PR and FR,
respectively. We denote an arbitrary signed message (m,σi),
where σi is a valid digital signature on message m with respect
to a pseudonym certiﬁcate ρi. We use the term ‘canonical
identity’ to refer to the proper legal identity of the vehicle
occupant or owner.
• SR1 - Message authenticity. A recipient of a V2X signed
message (m,σi) and its corresponding pseudonym cer-
tiﬁcate ρi must be certain of its integrity and (pseudony-
mous) origin.
• PR1 - Vehicle pseudonymity. A signed message (m,σi)
and its pseudonym certiﬁcate ρi must not reveal the
canonical identity of the vehicle owner.
• PR2 - Vehicle accountability. Optionally, a suitable au-
thority should be able to resolve a signed message
(m,σi) and its pseudonym certiﬁcate ρi to a canonical
identity.
• PR3 - Pseudonym unlinkability. Given a pseudonym
certiﬁcate ρi, an adversary should learn nothing about a
distinct pseudonym certiﬁcate ρj which it did not know
before learning ρi.
• PR4 - Corrupt CA tolerance. The corruption of a single
authority (i.e. either the EA or the AA) must not enable
any number of signed messages (m,σ0), . . . , (m′, σj)
or the pseudonym certiﬁcates which authenticate them
ρ0, . . . , ρj to be linked to any canonical vehicle identity.
See Section V-C1 for our discussion of the limits on
achievable privacy in V2X.
• FR1 - Limited and intermittent vehicle connectivity. A
V2X scheme must support vehicles that have limited
bandwidth and which suffer from intermittent connectiv-
ity to centralised services. It is likely that there will be
a large number of retroﬁtted connected vehicles during
early deployment.
• FR2 - Limited vehicle resources. A V2X scheme must
be designed with respect for the limited processing and
storage capabilities of the vehicle OBU. The standard
benchmark in the literature is that a vehicle must be able
to cryptographically verify as many as 1000 messages
per second [43]. In addition, vehicles are expected to
generate and sign 10 messages per second, and must not
require excessive storage space for certiﬁcates.
• FR3 - Sybil attack resistance. A V2X scheme must resist
attacks which depend upon creating large numbers of
adversarially concocted pseudonymous identities.
• FR4 - PKI removal of misbehaving vehicles. A V2X
scheme must be able to remove misbehaving vehicles.
Vehicle removal should be possible using either the
canonical identity or a pseudonym certiﬁcate sent by the
vehicle.
• FR5 - ETSI compliant. The scheme must be compati-
ble with the ETSI ITS security architecture [44]. This
ensures that a scheme is practical, both in terms of
European interoperability and meeting the performance
requirements (i.e. those determined by PRESERVE [43])
on constrained vehicle hardware).
V. V2X FORMAL MODEL
This section describes our formalisation of the ETSI V2X
system model and we formalise the terms ‘secure V2X’ and
‘privacy conscious V2X’.
A. V2X Scheme
Our formal deﬁnition of a V2X scheme is as follows
Deﬁnition 6. (V2X scheme). A V2X scheme Π is composed
by the following efﬁcient algorithms and protocols
• an algorithm CreatePKI which outputs the public and
private PKI parameters (PP,SP). The public parameters
are the public keys of the root CA, the EA and the AA.
The secret parameters are the corresponding private keys;
• an algorithm CreateVehicle which outputs the TE pub-
lic key pair (PTE, kTE) and the OBU public key pair
(POBU, kOBU);
• an interactive protocol EnrolVehicle between a vehicle
and the EA;
• an interactive protocol AuthoriseVehicle between a ve-
hicle and the AA;
B. V2X Security
In this section we formalise the security of a V2X scheme.
The key security requirement of a V2X scheme is message
authenticity (SR1). We capture this requirement by deﬁning
the authentication game Auth-Game.
Firstly, we overload the standard digital signature veriﬁca-
tion algorithm V from Section II-C as follows. We let V take
as input the pseudonym certiﬁcate ρ, the V2X scheme root
CA public key PΠ, the message m and the message signature
σ. V(ρ, PΠ,m, σ) returns true only if:
• σ is a valid signature on m with respect to the deﬁnition
of a secure digital signature scheme in Section II-C and
the public key Pρ of the pseudonym certiﬁcate ρ;
• the certiﬁcate path from the pseudonym certiﬁcate ρ to
the V2X scheme root certiﬁcate is valid. This means that
each certiﬁcate has a valid signature and that the issuer
and subject public keys form an uninterrupted chain from
PΠ to Pρ [45].
The authentication game takes as input the security parame-
ter η and the efﬁcient adversary C. During the game C interacts
with the V2X scheme Π which includes Nc vehicles. We
assume C receives all of the messages sent by vehicles in
the scheme as they are within transmission range. After some
arbitrary period, C outputs the signed message and pseudonym
certiﬁcate (m,σ, ρ). We require that m is not equal to any
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message sent by any of the vehicles in the V2X scheme Π.
The adversary C wins the game if V(ρ, PΠ,m, σ) returns true.
Auth-GameΠ(η, C) :
(PP,SP) ← CreatePKI(η)
(m,σ, ρ) ← CΠ(SP)(η,PP)
win if V(ρ, PΠ,m, σ) = true
Deﬁnition 7 (Secure V2X scheme). We say that a V2X
scheme Π is secure if for all efﬁcient adversaries C, the
probability of the experiment Auth-GameΠ(η, C) = true is
a negligible function of η.
C. V2X Privacy
In this section we formalise the privacy notions for a V2X
scheme.
1) Achievable Privacy: We cannot cryptographically de-
fend against the functional requirement that vehicles frequently
broadcast highly unique positional and trajectory data to an
audience bounded only by transmission distance [1]. Even
‘perfectly unlinkable’ V2X signatures which use a different
pseudonym for each message are vulnerable to attacks which
exploit the relationship between vehicle position and speed at
different points in time [46], [47].
Instead, we consider separately the contents of broadcast
messages and their cryptographic signatures. This allows us
to quantify the privacy leakage of the cryptographic protocols
of a V2X scheme in a way which is not dependent on either
human behaviour or vendor speciﬁc implementation details.
Deﬁning V2X privacy in terms of cryptographic linkability,
disentangled from the functional contents of CAM, captures
the set of realistic adversaries who only have a partial overview
of the whole environment. Such adversaries face periods of
uncertainty in which a target vehicle is seemingly not broad-
casting its location or trajectory. Provided there is sufﬁcient
noise in the form of other vehicles, an adversary becomes
uncertain about reidentifying the target vehicle.
2) V2X Privacy: We deﬁne V2X privacy with respect to
pseudonym change. To accomplish this we do not permit the
message contents to contribute to the adversaries advantage.
We use the notion of a vehicle reference analogously to
how pointers are used in computer programming languages.
The vehicle reference points to the vehicle ‘object’. The
vehicle object broadcasts V2X messages using the methods
and pseudonym scheme prescribed by the underlying V2X
scheme Π.
Deﬁnition 8 (Privacy adversary). The privacy adversary D is
an efﬁcient algorithm which takes as input the public PKI
parameters PP and has access to the following oracle which
we denote O
• CreateObscuredVehiclePair(c0, c1) which creates a
pair of enrolled vehicles by calling the CreateVehicle(),
EnrolVehicle() and AuthoriseVehicle() protocols.
Rather than sending regular CAM, these vehicles
transmit messages chosen uniformly at random from a
distribution M. The new vehicle pair is referenced as
(c0, c1).
Our privacy game is similar to the off-line Radio Frequency
IDentiﬁcation (RFID) privacy model developed by Garcia et
al. [48]. The game is played as follows.
Deﬁnition 9 (Privacy game). First the environment creates
the system parameters by calling Init, and then provides the
public parameters to the adversary D0. This adversary has
access to the oracle O. After a polynomial number of steps, D0
must output two target vehicle references c0 and c

1. Then, the
environment chooses a random bit b, invalidates the original
references to c0 and c

1 and calls the algorithm Delay which
waits for time t. The adversary D1 is given access to the oracle
O and one of the vehicle references cb . After a polynomial
number of steps, the adversary D1 outputs a guess bit b′. The
adversary wins the game if b′ = b.
t-Priv-GameΠ,D(η, t) :
(PP,SP) ← CreatePKI(η)
(c0, c

1) ← DO(SP)0 (PP)
b ← {0, 1}
Delay(t)
b′ ← DO(SP)1 (cb)
win if b = b′
Deﬁnition 10 (Privacy conscious V2X). A V2X scheme Π
is said to be privacy conscious if for all efﬁcient privacy
adversaries D = (D0,D1), and time t, the probability of
the experiment outcome t-Priv-GameΠ,D(η, t) = true is a
negligible function of η.
VI. IFAL
This section presents the full design and speciﬁcation of
our IFAL V2X scheme. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, we consider just one of each enrolment (EA), au-
thorisation (AA) and root CAs. Furthermore, we only consider
the most fundamental ITS service of basic CAM sending. The
IFAL scheme straightforwardly scales to a wide range of ITS
services, such as Electronic Trafﬁc Pricing [49], and to a larger
ecosystem of certiﬁcate authorities.
The differentiating approach of IFAL is to pre-issue vehicles
with a lifetime supply of short-lived pseudonym certiﬁcates
which can only be used after receiving an activation code. Each
activation code allows a speciﬁc vehicle to, in essence, derive
the pseudonym private keys for one epoch of pseudonym
certiﬁcates. Since all cars sold in the EU are legally required
since April 2018 to incorporate the ‘eCall’ emergency call
system which equips each vehicle with a mobile SIM card,
IFAL runs on existing infrastructure. Certiﬁcate pre-issuance
284
(EA)
Enrolment
Authority
(OBU) On-Board Unit
Vehicle 
Pseudonym
Vehicle 
Enrolment
(AA)
Authorisation
Authority
2.
1.
6.
5.
3.
4.
Fig. 3. Simpliﬁed IFAL PKI model.
1. The vehicle owner registers ID and public key value with the EA.
2. The EA provides the vehicle with an enrolment certiﬁcate and a unique
uid value.
3. The vehicle provides the enrolment certiﬁcate, its uid and an activation
code distribution channel speciﬁcation to the AA.
4. The AA provides the vehicle with a pseudonym certiﬁcate ﬁle.
5. The AA periodically sends activation codes for all entitled vehicles to the
EA.
6. The EA distributes activation codes by relating the uid to a vehicle identity
and a distribution channel speciﬁcation.
enables IFAL to support vehicles which do not have always-
on internet connections. Indeed, each activation code can be
represented as a 28-character alphanumeric string, comprising
a 128 bit symmetric key-factor and an additional 40 bit
epoch and certiﬁcate ﬁle identiﬁer. IFAL activation codes are
therefore easily sent using an SMS, or may even be entered
manually during a service interval. See Section VIII for a more
thorough analysis of the connectivity and bandwidth reduction
offered by the IFAL scheme.
IFAL removes the need for CRL as misbehaving vehicles
are simply denied the activation codes which are necessary to
derive the keys to future pseudonym certiﬁcates. The scheme
is ﬂexible with regards to trading between vehicle connectivity
requirements and the maximum time period of vehicle misbe-
haviour following revocation. Small CRL could remain part of
the scheme and would enable sufﬁciently connected vehicles
and roadside equipment to be almost entirely protected from
misbehaving entities.
IFAL runs on existing infrastructure and one ﬁxed-size IFAL
activation code can correspond to an arbitrary number of dif-
ferent pseudonym certiﬁcates. This is superior to using time-
limited certiﬁcates, in which it is necessary to trade bandwidth
(each certiﬁcate has a ﬁxed size) for privacy - the time-limit of
each certiﬁcate. Using the ETSI recommendation of 5 minutes
per certiﬁcate and an optimistic 1024-bit certiﬁcate size, one
days worth of pseudonym certiﬁcates would require 288 KB or
308 SMS messages which in practice is the difference between
a vehicle requiring a data subscription or not.
The IFAL scheme consists of three stages: initialisation,
activation and usage. Brieﬂy and as shown in Figure 3, the
EA provides each vehicle with a signed long-term enrolment
credential and an associated uid. The uid is shared between
the EA and the AA as a pseudonymous reference to the vehi-
cle. Vehicles authenticate themselves to the AA by presenting a
long-term enrolment credential and uid. The AA then provides
batches of pseudonymous certiﬁcates which authorise a vehicle
to send CAM.
Periodically, the AA sends new activation codes to the EA.
The EA sends the activation codes to the vehicle using a pre-
arranged channel (e.g. SMS).
A. IFAL Preliminaries
IFAL requires one or more trust anchors to be in place
before the initialisation protocol is run. Speciﬁcally, IFAL
requires a root CA and its signature on the EA and AA public
keys. Each vehicle OBU must be securely issued the root CA
public key during manufacture. The root CA public key is
used to verify the EA and the AA during the remainder of the
scheme.
The ETSI ITS standard [40] prescribes the use of either
NIST Curve P-256 [50] or BrainpoolP256r1 [51] as the
scheme elliptic curve C. Both curves specify base points G of
prime order n, where n is of length 256 bits. The parameters
C, G and n are public values which we do not explicitly pass
as input to the algorithms which utilise them.
IFAL requires a hash function, a public key encryption
scheme and a symmetric key encryption scheme for which, in
accordance with the ETSI ITS standard, we specify SHA-256
[52], Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
[53] and the NIST SP 800-108 AES CMAC pseudorandom
function [54] respectively.
1) IFAL KDF deﬁnitions: IFAL makes use of two secure
and standards-conformant KDFs which we denote K1 and K2.
We deﬁne both K1 and K2 as NIST SP 800-108 key derivation
functions [55] in counter mode, using cipher-based message
authentication code (CMAC) [54] as the pseudorandom func-
tion. The length of derived keys for both K1 and K2 is 256 bits.
Both K1 and K2 output elements in Zn\{0} using any suitable
technique [56].
K2 has the additional property of being a symmetric key
encryption function. E = (E,D) = (K2,K−12 ) such that for
a key k, and a ﬁxed-length derivation bitstring D , where
|D| ≤256 bits, the property K−12 (k,K2(k,D)) = D holds.
0x1||Context (14 bytes)||0x100
CMACk(.)
0x2||Context (14 bytes)||0x100
CMACk(.)
||
K2(256 bytes)
Fig. 6. K2 NIST SP 800-108 KDF construction
2) Policy Files: IFAL Policy ﬁles deﬁne the security pa-
rameters of the scheme as illustrated in Figure 4. A policy ﬁle
speciﬁes the pseudonym certiﬁcate validity period Tperiod, the
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CNcerts
Epoch Nepochs
C0
C1
C4
C2
C3
Epoch 0 
C5
...
...
Tstart Toverlap Toverlap
Epoch 1 
Fig. 4. IFAL policy parameters
pseudonym overlap period Toverlap which deﬁnes the require-
ments for time synchronisation between vehicles, the number
of pseudonyms per certiﬁcate ﬁle Ncerts, the number of epochs
which divide the certiﬁcate ﬁle Nepochs and an encoding which
speciﬁes the expected format. The minimum certiﬁcate validity
period is derived by subtracting the overlap period from the
total validity period: Tminimum = Tperiod − Toverlap.
3) Certiﬁcate Files: A certiﬁcate ﬁle comprises a digest of
the policy ﬁle, the valid-from time Tstart, a transport key kT and
the list of signed certiﬁcates C0, . . . , CNcerts . The transport key
kT is retained by the AA and is used to encrypt the activation
keys which are transmitted to the vehicle via the EA.
4) Auxiliary Algorithms: IFAL requires two auxiliary algo-
rithms which we now deﬁne.
• The CreateMetadata algorithm takes as input the
IFAL policy ﬁle and returns the metadata which is put
at the beginning of each certiﬁcate ﬁle. The metadata is
a tuple which comprises the ﬁrst certiﬁcate validity time
Tstart, a hash of the policy ﬁle, the transport key encrypted
using the vehicle OBE public key ENC(POBE, kT ) and a
certiﬁcate ﬁle encoding speciﬁcation.
• The GetCertValidity algorithm takes as input a
certiﬁcate index i, a policy ﬁle and a certiﬁcate ﬁle start
time Tstart, and returns a tuple containing the start and
end validity time of certiﬁcate i in the certiﬁcate ﬁle.
B. IFAL Initialisation Protocol
The ﬁrst stage of the IFAL scheme is the initialisation
protocol, shown in Figure 5, during which a vehicle becomes
enrolled in the scheme for the ﬁrst time.
The vehicle OBU is installed with a policy ﬁle and a root
certiﬁcate. The EA generates a public key pair (kEA, PEA) and
the AA generates a public key pair (kAA, PAA), a signature
counter symmetric key ksc and a signature counter sc which
is initialised to zero. The vehicle OBU generates a public key
pair (kOBU, POBU) and then initialises the TE, which generates
a public key pair (kTE, PTE). The TE returns its public key to
the OBU. The OBU composes the two vehicle public keys
POBU, PTE, the policy ﬁle, and an activation code channel
speciﬁcation into an authRequest which is signed and then
sent to the EA.
The EA receives the authRequest, veriﬁes the signature, and
awaits out-of-band documentation which asserts the vehicle
registrant. The EA role is most naturally assumed by an
existing national vehicle registration agency. Next, the EA gen-
erates a unique vehicle uid which is used as a pseudonymous
EA AAOBETE
Vehicle
init
PTE
authRequest(POBE, PTE, ...)
enrolCred(uid, ...)
kTE
$ {0,1}n
PTE = kTE×G
kOBE
$ {0,1}n
POBE = kOBE×G
file
kEA
$ {0,1}n
PEA = kEA×G
kAA
$ {0,1}n
PAA = kAA×G
uid
$ {0,1}8
sc = 0
ksc
$ {0,1}n
GenCertFile(enrolCred, ksc, sc, kAA)
CertSign(...)
enrolCred(uid, ...)
Fig. 5. IFAL initialisation protocol
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vehicle reference between the EA and AA. The EA composes
the authRequest and the uid into an enrolment credential
enrolCred which is signed, encrypted using the OBU public
key POBU and then returned to the vehicle.
Finally, the OBU requests the certiﬁcate ﬁle from the
AA by submitting its enrolment credential. The AA calls
the GenCertFile algorithm (Algorithm 1) which creates
the certiﬁcate ﬁle and the associated activation codes. The
pseudonym activation codes are linked to the vehicle uid and
retained by the AA. The certiﬁcate ﬁle is returned to the
requesting vehicle which veriﬁes that the ﬁle was crafted in
accordance with the policy.
1) Initialisation Algorithms: During the IFAL initialisation
protocol, the AA creates a certiﬁcate ﬁle by calling the
GenCertFile algorithm. Each pseudonym certiﬁcate in the
certiﬁcate ﬁle is issued by calling the CertSign algorithm
(See Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 1: GenCertFile
input: authRequest, ksc, sc, kAA
1 Create new record for uid
2 for j ← 0 to Nepochs−1 do
3 kj
$←− {0, 1}n
4 Add k0, . . . , kNepochs−1 to the record for uid
5 Generate new ﬁle
6 header = CreateMetadata(policy)
7 Write header to ﬁle
8 for i ← 0 to Ncerts do
9 j = i/Nepochs
10 validity = GetCertValidity(i, policy)
11 Pi = K1(kj , i)× PTE
12 content = validity ‖ Pi
13 signature = CertSign(content, uid, ksc, sc, kAA)
14 certiﬁcate = content ‖ signature
15 Write certiﬁcate to ﬁle
16 return ﬁle
The GenCertFile algorithm takes as input the authRe-
quest from the vehicle, the signature counter key ksc, the
signature counter sc and the AA private key kAA. The au-
thRequest contains the IFAL policy ﬁle and the vehicle public
keys (POBU, PTE). The policy ﬁle speciﬁes the number of
pseudonym certiﬁcates Ncerts and the number of epochs Nepochs
which are used by the algorithm. The algorithm returns an
IFAL certiﬁcate ﬁle which contains a batch of pseudonym
certiﬁcates and the metadata necessary to use them. The
certiﬁcate ﬁle is encrypted using the vehicle OBU public key
POBU.
Algorithm 2: CertSign
input: pseudonym, uid, ksc, sc, kAA
1 sc = sc+ 1
2 if sc = (2|sc| − 1) then
3 kAA
$←− {0, 1}n
4 PAA = kAA ×G
5 ksc
$←− {0, 1}n
6 sc = 0
7 k = K2(ksc, sc ‖ uid); (x, y) = k ×G
8 r = x mod n; h =Hash(pseudonym)
9 s = k−1(h+ kAA ∗ r) mod n
10 if r = 0 OR s = 0 then
11 goto line 1
12 return (r, s)
The CertSign algorithm returns a signed IFAL
pseudonym certiﬁcate. The algorithm performs a variant of
the deterministic ECDSA signature algorithm [57] in which
the randomisation key k, which is usually a random bitstring,
is derived by applying the secure KDF K2, such that k =
K2(ksc, sc ‖ uid). The derived key k can be used by the AA
to recover the uid from messages signed by a misbehaving
vehicle.
The signature counter sc is incremented each time the
CertSign algorithm is called so that each signature key and
counter tuple (ksc, sc) is unique. The algorithm also checks
that sc has not reached its maximum value and, once reached,
generates a new signature key ksc, re-initialises sc to zero and
generates a new public key pair (kAA, PAA).
C. IFAL Activation Protocol
The IFAL activation protocol is a periodic process in which
the AA distributes new activation codes to authorised vehicles
via the EA. Each activation code permits the vehicle to
generate the set of pseudonym private keys which correspond
to one epoch of certiﬁcates from the certiﬁcate ﬁle.
The activation protocol proceeds as shown in Figure 7. The
AA maintains a database which relates the pseudonymous uid
of each vehicle and the activation codes which were generated
during the initialisation protocol. The AA iterates the database
and sends each uid and the next corresponding activation-
Code to the EA. Separately, the EA maintains a database
EA AA
activationCode
activationCode
activationCode, uid
/* for each UID:           */
/*    Send activation code */
/* end                     */
OBETE
Vehicle
Fig. 7. IFAL activation protocol
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which links each uid with a canonical vehicle identity and
an activationCode channel speciﬁcation. The EA sends each
new activationCode to the vehicle corresponding to the uid
indicated by the AA. The activationCode channel can range
from manual installation (e.g. during annual servicing) to ad-
hoc over-the-air delivery, depending upon the connectivity of
the vehicle. Each activationCode is only 128 bits in size and
is therefore readily sent using an SMS message. The vehicle
decrypts the activationCode using the transport key which
was in the certiﬁcate ﬁle received from the AA during the
initialisation protocol.
D. IFAL Usage Protocol
The IFAL usage protocol is run each time a vehicle signs
a message. The protocol is comparable to the ECDSA algo-
rithm, however the message digest is subject to an additional
transformation process (similar to Chaum’s blind signatures
[58]) and the algorithm execution steps are shared between
the vehicle TE and OBU. Speciﬁcally, the OBU computes
the hash of the message and then applies a transformation
function. The TE generates a signature on the transformed
message hash which is returned to the OBU. The OBU applies
a ﬁnal transformation to the signature which completes the
signature generation process.
Algorithm 3: MessageSign
input: message, t, Tstart, Tminimum, Ncerts
1 i = (t− Tstart)/Tminimum
2 epoch = i/Ncerts
/* If no kepoch return error */
3 kcert = K1(kepoch, i)
4 h = Hash(message)
5 h′ = h ∗ k−1cert mod n
6 (r, s) = Sign(h’)
7 s′ = s ∗ kcert mod n
8 return (r, s′)
The vehicle OBU computes the IFAL signature on a mes-
sage as follows (See Algorithm 3). Firstly the MessageSign
algorithm identiﬁes the epoch key kepoch corresponding to the
certiﬁcate which is valid at the time of sending the message.
The MessageSign algorithm takes as input the unsigned
message, the current vehicle time t, the certiﬁcate ﬁle start
time Tstart, the minimum certiﬁcate validity period Tminimum
and the number of certiﬁcates Ncerts.
Next, The pseudonym private key kcert is derived by ap-
plying the K1 KDF to the certiﬁcate index value i using the
epoch key kepoch. The algorithm computes the hash digest h of
the message, and then multiplies it by the inverse pseudonym
private key k−1cert to yield the transformed message digest h′.
The algorithm execution now passes to the vehicle TE which
runs the Sign algorithm (Algorithm 4). The Sign algorithm
takes as input the transformed message digest h′ and the TE
private key kTE, and returns the ECDSA signature (r, s) on
h′.
The vehicle OBU takes the TE signature (r, s) and trans-
forms s by multiplying it by the pseudonym private key kcert
Algorithm 4: Sign
input: h′, kTE
1 k
$←− Zn \ {0}
2 (x, y) = k ×G
3 r = x mod n.
4 s = k−1(h′ + kTE ∗ r) mod n
5 if r = 0 OR s = 0 then
6 goto line 1
7 return (r, s)
to yield s′ = kcert ∗ s. The IFAL signature (r, s′) is output by
the MessageSign algorithm.
We show that the signature tuple (r, s′) output by the
MessageSign algorithm is a valid signature with respect
to pseudonym public key Pi in the Appendix.
E. IFAL Removal of Misbehaving Vehicles
There are two different mechanisms by which vehicles can
be removed from the IFAL PKI.
The ﬁrst mechanism is that the EA receives a request to
deactivate a vehicle based on its canonical identity. This could
occur when a vehicle is taken off the road by its owner, or after
a vehicle is ‘written off’ by an insurer following an accident.
The EA uses the canonical vehicle registration information to
look up the uid associated with the vehicle and then sends
a removal request to the AA. The AA will no longer issue
activation codes to the vehicle and so the vehicle will be unable
to create valid message signatures after, at most, the duration
of one certiﬁcate policy ﬁle epoch. The EA gate keeps re-
enrolment depending upon the reasons for deactivation and
based on existing regional vehicle registration laws.
The second mechanism is that the AA is notiﬁed, by
a suitable authority, of pseudonym certiﬁcates belonging to
a vehicle which has misbehaved. For example, the vehicle
might have been involved in a hit-and-run accident. The
pseudonym certiﬁcate will be of the form (r, s), where (r, s) =
(x mod n, k−1(h+ kAA ∗ r) mod n). This can be re-written
in terms of k such that k = s−1(h + kAA ∗ r) mod n. As
k was generated by the invertible KDF K2, the AA can use
K−12 (ksc, k) = sc ‖ uid to recover the uid of the vehicle
which has sent the message. The AA will no longer issue
activation codes to this uid, and can also share the uid with
the EA so that the canonical vehicle registration information
can be linked to the incident.
VII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF IFAL
A. IFAL Security Proof
This section shows that IFAL is a secure V2X scheme with
respect to Deﬁnition 7.
Theorem 1. Let
∑
be a EUF-CMA secure signature scheme,
then the IFAL scheme we present in Section VI is a secure
V2X scheme.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that IFAL is not a secure
V2X scheme. This means that for Nc vehicles, and for
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i, j ∈ {0, . . . Nc − 1} where i = j, there is an adversary C
who controls the communication links and manages, with non-
negligible probability, to deliver a message (m,σ) to a vehicle
cj , such that the sender ci has not sent m but cj accepts m
as authentic and coming from ci.
We show how to use C to break the security of one of the
underlying cryptographic primitives. Speciﬁcally, we construct
an adversary B which uses C to win the game EUF-CMA.
At the beginning, the adversary B randomly picks a target
vehicle c and an epoch e. B will execute adversary C, for
this B needs to emulate the PKI environment and the vehicles
{c0, . . . , cNc−1} \ {c}. To emulate the PKI environment, B
ﬁrst generates the EA and AA credentials. The AA credentials
include the signature counter sc and the counter key ksc.
Next, adversary B must emulate all of the vehicles required
by adversary C. Emulating the vehicle ci means generating the
vehicle public key pairs (kTE, PTE) and (kOBU, POBU), and then
enrolling and authorising the vehicle in the PKI environment
by emulating the EnrolVehicle and AuthoriseVehicle proto-
cols, respectively. Adversary C is given access to the vehicle
oracles c0, . . . , cNc−1 and c
. When emulating c, B will use
the signing oracle OS from the EUF-CMA game. For all
the other cases, B will compute signed messages by using
the vehicle private keys and executing the MessageSign
algorithm.
At some point, after a number of pseudonym validity
periods Np, adversary C terminates. With a non-negligible
probability there must exist a cj which accepts a signed
message (m,σ) from ci. In order for cj to accept the signed
message, it means that C has sent a signed message (m,σ)
which contains a valid signature σ on message m and a
matching certiﬁcate from a trusted authorisation authority.
Speciﬁcally, a signed message (m,σ) is an IEEE
WAVE compliant signed CAM [41] crafted according
to the ETSI ITS CAM security proﬁle [40]. Where
m is the triplet (hashId,tbsData,signer) and σ
is the signature, the signed message (m,σ) is a
IEEE1609dot2 SignedData element as shown in Fig-
ure 8.
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
hashId HashAlgorithm,
tbsData ToBeSignedData,
signer SignerIdentifier,
signature Signature
}
Fig. 8. SignedData speciﬁcation from IEEE 1609.2 [41].
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
digest HashedId8,
certificate SequenceOfCertificate,
self NULL,
...
}
Fig. 9. SignerIdentifier speciﬁcation from IEEE 1609.2 [41].
If ci = c the adversary C will send the signed message
(m,σ) to adversary B, otherwise it will not. In order to win
the EUF-CMA game the adversary B needs to output a signed
message (m,σ) such that
1. V(v, σ,m) = true;
2. the signed message was never queried to the signature
oracle.
Condition 1. holds because the signed message (m,σ) has
a valid signature since it was veriﬁed by vehicle cj .
Veriﬁcation by cj means all of the following must be true
1. If the message SignerIdentifier component (see
Figure 9) is a digest then cj has previously received
the certiﬁcate to which the digest belongs;
2. The authoritative certiﬁcate on the signature has a valid
certiﬁcation path;
3. The message includes a valid signature as determined
by V(v, σ,m) = true.
Condition 2. holds because m was not queried to the
signature oracle OS . As the vehicle c is chosen randomly by
adversary B before the PKI initialisation phase, the probability
that adversary C also attacks c is P [c = ci] = 1/Nc
The advantage of the adversary C in winning the
Auth-Game is therefore the probability that C attacks c
multiplied by the advantage of B against the signature scheme.
Since C may attack either the signature on the message dur-
ing a pseudonym validity period, or the authoritative signature
at any stage of the certiﬁcation path, the advantage of the
adversary is further divided by the length of the certiﬁcation
path  and the number of pseudonym validity periods over
which the game is played Np.
AdvAuth-GameC =
AdvEUF-CMAB (η)
 ∗Nc ∗Np
B. IFAL Privacy Proof
In this section we show that, for a period of time t > Tperiod,
IFAL satisﬁes the notion of V2X privacy in Deﬁnition 8;
Informally an adversary cannot link separate pseudonyms
because all pseudonym keys are output by a secure KDF. For
an adversary to win the t-Priv-Game with a non-negligible
probability, the adversary must be able to learn something
which is common to each of the keys. Since a secure KDF
has the property that the output keys are indistinguishable
from random bitstrings, and random bitstrings do not tell us
anything about future random bitstrings, no adversary could
link different pseudonyms to a single source.
The IFAL signature scheme is privacy conscious because
a secure KDF is used to generate the pseudonym public and
private keys. Where kTE is the TE private key, kepoch is the
activation key, K2 is a secure KDF and i is the pseudonym
certiﬁcate index, we deﬁne the following pseudonym KDF
Kpseudo(kepoch, i) = K2(kepoch, i) ∗ kTE mod n
Theorem 2. If K2 is a secure KDF, then Kpseudo is a secure
KDF with respect to Deﬁnition 1.
By deﬁnition, the output of K2 is a random bitstring in
the ﬁeld Z∗n. Since kTE is a cryptographically secure ECDSA
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private key generated by a secure hardware component, and
modular multiplication under a prime modulus n is uniformly
distributed in Z∗n, then Kpseudo is a secure KDF. Where i is
the certiﬁcate index in the certiﬁcate ﬁle and kepoch is the
corresponding activation key, each pseudonym private key is
calculated by applying the pseudonym KDF Kpseudo as follows
kpseudo = Kpseudo(kepoch, i)
Theorem 3. If Kpseudo is a secure KDF, then IFAL satisﬁes
the notion of V2X privacy in Deﬁnition 8;
From Theorem 2 it follows that the pseudonym private key
kpseudo is a random bitstring in the ﬁeld Z∗n. The pseudonym
public key is produced by multiplying kpseudo by the elliptic
curve base point G. Elliptic curve multiplication does not yield
a secure KDF since, on all standard curves, a curve point is
highly distinguishable from a random bitstring [59]. However,
in our notion of V2X privacy, we only require that the vehicle
public key is indistinguishable from a random point on the
curve. It therefore sufﬁces that the pseudonym private key
kpseudo is output by a secure KDF.
Proof. Assume that the IFAL CAM protocol is not privacy
conscious. This means that there is an adversary D = (D0,D1)
that wins the Priv-Game with non-negligible probability.
We build an adversary E which uses D to win the game
(q,t,ε)-Secure-KDF-Game and break the underlying secure
KDF.
The adversary E initialises the system and then runs the
adversary D0 simulating all oracle calls. Eventually D0 ﬁn-
ishes and outputs an obscured vehicle pair (c0, c1). Next, as
in the privacy game, E will draw a random bit b, wait for
duration t, and then run the second adversary D1(cb). D1 will
eventually output a bit b′. By hypothesis, b′ = b will occur
with a probability signiﬁcantly higher than 1/2. This means
that D has distinguished the pseudonym public key of cb from
that of cb−1.
In order to win the (q,t,ε)-Secure-KDF-Game, either
1) The period of time t, between D0 and D1 having access
to the vehicle cb, is less than the certiﬁcate validity pe-
riod Tperiod. If t < Tperiod then cb will broadcast messages
which are signed using a certiﬁcate which was witnessed
by D0. D will win the (q,t,ε)-Secure-KDF-Game with
advantage 1;
2) The adversary D broke the KDF which generated cb’s
latest pseudonym key and was able to link the public
keys revealed to D0 with the ones revealed to D1 by cb.
Condition 1. holds provided that t > Tperiod. Condition 2.
holds because D was able to output b′ = b with a probability
signiﬁcantly higher than 1/2. This means that the public keys
revealed to D1 by cb were able to be linked to the public
keys revealed to D0 by cb. Since t > Tperiod we know that, at
the very least, two different public keys were witnessed by D.
From Theorem 2 we know that each public key was calculated
by multiplying a random bitstring output by a secure KDF
by the base point G. Therefore, D must be able to break the
secure KDF construction and learn something about the source
of keying material allowing it to link separate public keys.
Where Tperiods is the number of pseudonym validity periods
which separate the adversaries D0 and D1, calculated as the
integer ceiling division of t by Tperiod, and q is the number
of KDF queries, the advantage of adversary D in winning the
t-Priv-Game is therefore
Advt-Priv-GameD = Tperiods ∗ Adv(q,t,ε)-KDF-GameA (Tperiods)
VIII. EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE
In this section we argue that the IFAL scheme we have pre-
sented in Section VI meets the ETSI V2X security architecture
requirements from Section IV.
The security requirement of message authenticity (SR1) is
satisﬁed because IFAL is a secure V2X as we have shown in
Section VII-A.
There are four privacy requirements. Vehicle pseudonymity
(PR1) is satisﬁed by the structure of ETSI CAM given in
Figure 2, which does not reveal the canonical identity of
the message sender, and by the fact that IFAL is a privacy
conscious V2X scheme which we have shown in Section
VII-B. Vehicle accountability (PR2) is satisﬁed because user
pseudonymity can be revoked, as shown Section VI-E. We
prove pseudonym unlinkability (PR3) in Section VII-B where
we have shown that IFAL is a privacy conscious V2X scheme.
Finally, IFAL satisﬁes the requirement for corrupt CA tol-
erance (PR4) because neither the EA nor the AA alone
can determine the canonical identity of a vehicle from only
captured V2X messages.
As speciﬁed in the relevant ETSI standards [60], the AA
should be implemented using an HSM to execute the key
generation, GenCertFile and CertSign algorithms. The
HSM should generate the pseudonym certiﬁcates and the
activation codes and encrypt them using the vehicle OBU
public key POBU and the transport key kT respectively. Access
to the uid recovery operation outlined in Section VI-E should
be controlled through a separate ’recovery HSM’. A dedicated
misbehaviour authority (MA) [6] could be established and
entrusted to operate the recovery HSM, thus ensuring that no
single entity can revoke user pseudonymity.
There are four functional V2X scheme requirements. IFAL
caters for limited and intermittent vehicle connectivity (FR1).
Activation codes are only 128 bits in size and can therefore be
represented as a 28-character alphanumeric string, including an
additional 40 bit epoch and certiﬁcate ﬁle identiﬁer. Activation
codes can be be communicated over a wide range of different
channels: one viable option is to use SMS which all new
vehicles will be required to be equipped with (i.e. eCall),
vehicles may even be entirely unconnected and activation
codes manually installed during vehicle service intervals.
IFAL only requires limited OBU and TE resources (FR2).
Signature veriﬁcation, the most time critical operation, is
unchanged from the standards, just one ECDSA veriﬁcation.
For signing, which has a modest 10 per second performance
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requirement, the computational complexity is only increased
by one KDF function call and one modular inverse operation
per pseudonym certiﬁcate every 5 minutes plus two modular
multiplications per message. These small overheads can easily
be accommodated within existing V2X hardware without a
signiﬁcant performance impact. A 5 year supply of IFAL
certiﬁcates requires as little as 32.1 megabytes of vehicle OBU
storage. We evaluate the IFAL certiﬁcate ﬁle creation and
storage requirements more thoroughly in Section VIII-A.
IFAL is Sybil attack resistant (FR3) because, at most,
only two IFAL pseudonym certiﬁcates are valid for a single
vehicle at the same time (determined by Toverlap). Having two
pseudonym certiﬁcates valid at the same time is optimal unless
you are willing to accept strict time synchronization between
the vehicles, and is much better than the SCMS C2C-CC
pseudonym certiﬁcate pooling approach in which there are 20-
40 simultaneously valid vehicle credentials which are changed
weekly [24].
IFAL supports the PKI removal of misbehaving vehicles
using either the vehicle canonical identity or a pseudonym
certiﬁcate (FR4), as we have shown in Section VI-E. The
parameters in an IFAL policy ﬁle exchanged during the ini-
tialisation protocol both determine the granularity with which
misbehaving vehicles can be removed from the scheme and
deﬁne the connectivity requirements for enrolled vehicles.
A misbehaving vehicle can continue to misbehave for as
long as the activation codes for future epochs are known.
Equivalently, vehicles must be able to connect to an EA as
often as they require new activation codes. These parameters
therefore present a trade off between connectivity requirements
for activation code issuance, certiﬁcate storage requirements,
and the removal of misbehaving vehicles.
Fig. 10. IFAL vs. ETSI ITS: Cellular
bandwidth requirements
IFAL is superior to
the ETSI standard ap-
proach of using time-
limited certiﬁcates be-
cause it is not necessary
to compromise between
the bandwidth required
for transferring certiﬁ-
cates and the privacy af-
forded by the time-limit
of each certiﬁcate. Using
the ETSI recommenda-
tion of 5 minutes per certiﬁcate and an optimistic 1024-bit
certiﬁcate size, one days worth of pseudonym certiﬁcates
would require at least 288 KB or 308 SMS messages of
bandwidth. We compare the bandwidth requirements of the
ETSI approach with IFAL in Figure 10.
In practice, IFAL will likely require less than a single text
message worth of bandwidth per day and is the difference
between a vehicle requiring a data subscription or not.
Finally, IFAL conforms to ETSI ITS standards and security
architecture (FR5) as we have used the system model and the
same cryptographic primitives.
A. Experimental Results
We have created a proof of concept reference implementa-
tion of IFAL in C++ based on the Crypto++ library and used
our implementation to evaluate the practicality of our scheme.
Since signature veriﬁcation on the vehicle is unchanged,
namely a standard ECDSA veriﬁcation operation, and we
do not add signiﬁcant computational complexity to message
signing, we focused on the performance of the server-side
GenCertFile and CertSign algorithms executed by the
AA (See Algorithm 1 and 2 in Section VI-B).
We wrote an IFAL policy specifying a certiﬁcate ﬁle with
a 5 year total duration, a 90 day epoch duration, a 5 minute
pseudonym duration and a 2 minute overlap period. Using
a standard desktop computer we were able to compute the
certiﬁcate ﬁle containing 5 years of pseudonym certiﬁcates
in 9.03 seconds on average. Our reference certiﬁcate ﬁle
contains 525,600 pseudonym certiﬁcates and therefore requires
at least 525, 600 ∗ 1024 ≈ 64.2 MB of storage on the vehicle.
Additionally, the certiﬁcate ﬁle can be halved in size to just
32.1 MB if the vehicle OBE has sufﬁcient resources to derive
the pseudonym public keys as they are required.
We have made our reference implementation open source
and freely available at https://github.com/hkscy/IFAL.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented the Issue First Activate
Later (IFAL) V2X scheme which is a practical improvement
upon the ETSI ITS standard V2X architecture.
We introduce a novel key diversiﬁcation method that both
avoids the need for certiﬁcate revocation and enables support
for vehicles with limited and intermittent connectivity. The
IFAL scheme pre-issues vehicles with a lifetime supply of
pseudonym certiﬁcates during manufacture, divides the cer-
tiﬁcates into epochs and then periodically issues activation
codes which enable a vehicle to derive pseudonym signatures
during an epoch. By removing the need for CRL, IFAL offers
improved veriﬁcation latency over the previous proposals.
Activation codes are much smaller than the corresponding
pseudonym certiﬁcates and therefore facilitate a much broader
range of vehicle connectivities. Several activation codes ﬁt
within a single SMS message and may even be entered
manually during vehicle servicing. Misbehaving vehicles are
removed from the scheme by refusing to issue further acti-
vation codes and therefore denying vehicles the capability to
sign messages.
We have shown that IFAL meets the ETSI ITS V2X archi-
tecture requirements, is provably secure and privacy conscious
in a formal setting and has favourable performance in our
reference implementation. IFAL is suitable for integration into
the ETSI ITS standard.
Future research challenges include running simulations to
determine optimal key management policies as well as sym-
bolic protocol veriﬁcation. Optimal pseudonym change strate-
gies remain an open problem.
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APPENDIX
IFAL signature correctness. Here we show that the signature
tuple (r, s′) output by the MessageSign algorithm is
a valid signature with respect to pseudonym public key
Pi generated by the GenCertFile algorithm. Where
k
$←− Zn \ {0} is the ephemeral key generated by the
Sign algorithm and kcert = K1(kepoch, i) is the key derived
from an activation code by the MessageSign algorithm
r = x mod n
s = k−1(h′ + kTE ∗ r) mod n
∴ s = k−1(h ∗ k−1cert + kTE ∗ r) mod n
s′ = s ∗ kcert mod n
∴ s′ = kcert ∗ k−1(h ∗ k−1cert + kTE ∗ r) mod n
∴ s′ = k−1(h+ kcert ∗ kTE ∗ r) mod n
Pi = K1(kj , i)× PTE = kcert ∗ kTE ×G
Hence, (r, s′) is a standard ECDSA signature with respect
to the private key kcert ∗ kTE.
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